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Narrative and Drama in the American Trial 
 
Robert P. Burns 
Northwestern University School of Law 
 
The Trial as a Law Enforcement Device 
 
 One influential view of the American trial understands it precisely as an instrument 
of law enforcement.  I have called this conception “the received view of the trial.”  (Burns, 
1999: 10-33)  Here the trial is the institutional device to incarnate the rule of law where 
there are disputes of fact.  The “rule of law” is here conceived, as Justice Scalia is fond of 
calling it, “a law of rules,” rules which have the higher level of legitimacy that derives 
from their democratic pedigree in the constitution or legislature or, in a traditional notion 
of the common law, as the slow working out of the requirements of the natural law over 
time to produce norms superior to the likely intuitions of a given judge or jury.   
Additionally, liberal legality finds it important that these rules be announced before the 
action they are to control and that the same rules that were announced ahead of time be the 
very same rules that are applied in evaluating those actions.  (Hart 1968)   This both 
enhances the freedom of the citizen and controls the potentially arbitrary behavior of the 
“magistrate.”  Within the received view of the trial, “the law” exists before the trial begins 
and, in a strong sense, can be enforced through the trial’s devices.  I have written that one 
of the remarkable things about the Anglo-American trial is the extent to which these very 
utopian ideals of the rule of law were given very practical shape by the very practical 
utopians who were common law lawyers.   For example, the doctrine of materiality in 
Evidence law provides that no unit of evidence can be received at trial unless it has, as a 
matter of a common sense empirical generalization embedded in our “web of belief,” a link 
to one of the authoritative legal rules that control the case.  Thus, if the applicable landlord-
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tenant law provides (as Anglo-American property law traditionally did) that a tenant who 
fails to pay her rent may be evicted regardless of whether the apartment fails miserably to 
conform to the local building code, then the tenant will be barred from offering evidence of 
the condition of her apartment in an eviction trial.  To admit such evidence would be to 
tempt the jury to reach beyond the authoritative norm and decide the case based on its own 
sense of justice, an affront to the rule of law as a law of rules.  (Evidence law is more 
important in Anglo-American legal regimes than in Continental because of both the 
centrality of the jury and because of the adversary parties’ control over the presentation of 
evidence.) 
 
 So the trial’s rules and structure were designed to protect the rule of law as the law 
of rules.  But the institutions and practices of the trial are also designed to assure that facts 
are accurately determined.  After all, so the argument goes, the kind of justice germane to 
the trial is Aristotle’s compensatory or commutative justice, in different ways restoring 
parties to an assumed legitimate status quo ante that has been disrupted by illegal action.  
(Nicomachean Ethics 1131a-1132b) (Aristotle also notes in the Rhetoric, that narrative is 
the form particularly germane to forensic rhetoric, as is argument to political rhetoric. 
[Rhetoric  1414b])  There can be no vindication of the rights embedded in that status quo 
unless the judge or jury can apply the preexistent rules to the facts as they occurred.  If a 
judge or jury is either indifferent to accurate fact-finding, or unable to find facts accurately, 
there can be no legal vindication of rights and so no rule of law.  (Extreme fact-skepticism 
undermines the possibility of the rule of law.)  And so many of the devices of the trial are 
thought to enhance accurate fact finding by assuring that the evidence presented is 
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sufficiently reliable to depend on in an important matter.  This is the justification for the 
rules (as it turns out, shot through with exceptions) requiring the originals of documents, 
proof of the authenticity of physical evidence, and forbidding hearsay testimony.   
 
 This view of the trial is powerful, but partial.  It is powerful for a number of 
reasons.  First, as I mentioned, it connects up with important norms of liberal legality.  
Second, it is actually consistent with much of what we do at trial.  It is, as we have seen, 
the dominant philosophy embedded in the “rationalist tradition” in the law of evidence.  It 
explains the strange and artificial rules that control the direct examination of witnesses, 
where testimony is elicited through nonleading questions “in the language of perception,” 
that is, in a language artificially stripped (to the extent feasible) of opinions, conclusions, 
interpretations, and evaluations.  (It took a while for evidence writers who were educated 
to empiricism to concede that perceptions were inevitably “theory-laden.”)    Testimony in 
the language of perception, in the view of the architects of the common law trial, serves 
both  the normative and factual ideals animating the trial.  It assures that the witnesses may 
not surreptitiously inject their own norms into the evidence, compromising the rule of law 
and it offers the jury the witness’s perceptions, not those opinions and conclusions that 
were more likely to be the “anxious, usually self-preoccupied, falsifying veil,” in Iris 
Murdock’s famous phrase, that we have ourselves fabricated.  (Murdoch 1991: 83).  If the 
received view of the trial reflects our “considered judgments of justice,” then it has a claim 
on our allegiance and, when brought into “reflective equilibrium” with more abstract 
principles, additionally should play a role in even more theoretical accounts of what justice 
is.  (Rawls 1971: 579) 
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 So then, the received view conceives the trial an institutional device for deciding 
cases by stamping legal rules on an accurate account of past events presented in a form 
utterly plastic to those rules, a kind of normative “prime matter.”   This has sometimes 
been described as a “bureaucratic” notion of the trial.  The rules, which in the positivist 
version have a legitimacy based on their source in popular will, fully pre-exist the trial and 
fully determine the outcome.  (It recalls Thrasymachus’ view of rhetoric as the fully 
instrumental means for achieving the will of the stronger man’s fully pre-existing desires, 
where rhetorical power is itself an instance of strength.)  In its relatively  benign 
contemporary manifestation, it is an instrument for effecting popular will.   
 
The Trial and the Narratives of the Life-World 
 The received view is a very partial view of the trial, a kind of “misplaced 
concreteness” read off the law of evidence.  What more the trial is emerges from a thick 
description of what we actually do at trial, in particular, an account of the distinctive forms 
of trial narratives and the severe dramatic tensions that the trial’s “consciously structured 
hybrid of languages” creates. (I have argued that the tasks of an adequate philosophy of 
law will suggest that the line between philosophy and both anthropology and rhetorical 
studies will tend to blur. [Burns 2009a: 232])  And so my argument is largely carried by 
my description of the trial’s elements, and I can only provide that in barest outline here.  
Let me start with the conclusions of this descriptive effort.   
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 It turns out that the trial is not really a device for law enforcement  in a bureaucratic 
sense at all.  It is rather a forum within which “true law,” is discovered or revealed or 
realized in and through the tensions created by the trial’s “consciously structured hybrid of 
languages and practices.” It proceeds through the construction and deconstruction of 
different sorts of highly constrained narratives in a dramatic medium.  What notion of  law 
is in play here?  It’s the one which James White has characterized as “an old fashioned 
notion of law,” one where law is realized only through the dialogic tensions through which 
it is constituted.  (White 2011)   
 
 American trials begin with the opening statements of the parties.  (In criminal 
cases, the state is generally treated simply as one of the parties at trial.) Opening statements 
are narratives.  They tell a full “God’s eye” story of the events, a “vivid continuous 
dream,” woven of a double helix of norms.  The two strands are (1) the norms embedded in 
the law of rules and (2) the norms embedded in the life-world of the judge or jury.  (For 
ease of reference, I will call the trier of fact “the jury.”)   In American trials the parties 
initially define “what this case is about,” the “as-structure,” to use hermeneutical language,  
through which the jury is invited to interpret the inevitably underdetermining evidence to 
follow.   (This is in contrast to most European countries, where the judge’s questions tend 
to “frame” the case. [Damaska 1986])  Empirical investigators have found that it is through 
these narratives that the jurors organize the vast amounts of information that come to the 
jury in the course of the trial.  We have a natural “predisposition to organize experience 
into a narrative form into plot structures and the rest.” (Bruner 1990: 47).  Mercifully, 
these stories are not simply artifices imposed on a wholly resistant substrate; rather 
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narratives are “found …in the midst of experience and action, not in some higher level 
linguistic construction or reconstruction” and “are told in being lived, and lived in being 
told.” (Carr 1986).  As Alastair MacIntyre has argued, any attempt to understand a human 
action (and all trials are about human actions) “in themselves” and before, so to speak, the 
employment of narrative categories will yield only “the disjointed parts of some possible 
narrative.” (MacIntyre 1984: 212-3).  It will turn out that the ability of the trial to converge 
on a just decisions has a great deal to do about the way in which narratives, refined and 
disciplined by the devices of the trial, cut at the joints of a human action. 
 
 One of the strands in the double helix around such a narrative is built is the 
common-sense morality of the life-world.  The internal morality of narrative is thus highly 
contextual, not an “abstract computational morality,” in Hampshire’s terms.  It is, as 
Ricoeur argued, an “ethics already realized” in the life world.  It can draw on all the 
subtlety for the understanding of human action that the culture’s common sense can 
provide.  These stories can manifest or “show” what cannot otherwise be said.  “We 
narrate stories in order to make manifest whatever unsayable meaning resides in them.” 
(Luban 1994: 201).  Most stories are internally related to questions of justice and an 
important story schema—legitimate status quo, disruption of the status quo, and often 
difficult restoration—places jurors within the structure of commutative justice and reminds 
them of their practical task.  The story is over only when the jury’s verdict finishes it.  
And, as trial lawyers like to say, part of the goal of an effective opening state is to persuade 
the jury to want to rule for your client by an appeal to feelings as well as logic.  And this is 
to the good: 
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    Emotions can sometimes mislead and distort judgment; Aristotle is aware 
of this.  But they can also…give us access to a truer and deeper level of 
ourselves, to values and commitments that have been concealed by 
defensive ambition or rationalization. 
    But even this is, so far, too Platonic a line to take: for it suggests that 
emotion is valuable only as an instrumental means to a purely intellectual 
state. We know, however, that for Aristotle appropriate responses…can, 
like good intellectual responses, help to constitute the refined “perception” 
which is the best sort of human judgment. (Nussbaum 1986: 390)                      
 
In the United States this “legitimacy” of the jury’s life-world norms has deep historical 
roots in Federalist concepts of the popular sovereignty and Antifederalist notions, 
embedded in the Bill of Rights, that the jury retains some of a primordial sovereignty to 
continuously reevaluate the work of the “magistrates” in all three branches who always 
threaten “true law.”  (Wood 1969; Amar 1998: 94-103) 
 
 At trial, the first opening statement is followed by a second.  The second portrays 
the case as about something else and begins the battle for the imagination of the jury.  Trial 
lawyers are inclined to say with a only a bit of exaggeration, “Every fact has two faces.”  
Because the whole is understood in light of the part and the part in light of the whole, the 
relative meaning and plausibility of each of the pieces of evidence offered depends on the 
overall plausibility of each of the opening statements.   This plausibility is determined by 
internal narrative norms, such as coherence, by consistency with empirical common sense 
generalizations, and, more pragmatically, with the relative importance of the norms it 
evokes and the attractiveness of the course of action in which it invites the jury to engage.  
(Thus the trial’s holism is not merely theoretical, but also practical.)  The jury is thus 
engaged in an act of theory choice where the evidence is largely theory-laden and the 
process of decision making is both circular and practical.   
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 The opening statements relativize each other and dramatize the gap between the 
performing of a human action and the telling of it.  The two-story schema of the trial also 
mirrors an aspect of ordinary moral experience, again to cite Hampshire, where we 
oscillate back and forth between two ways of describing a possible action, where one way 
approve of what we are considering and the other condemns it.  The competing stories  
begin the process of resistance to the “aestheticizing of the moral” that students of 
narrative have warned us against.  After all, the teller of the better story should not 
necessarily be the winner of the trial.  And each of the trial lawyers must be aware that the 
story he or she tells will be evaluated, though deferentially, by the judge to determine 
whether the truth of the story would entitle the story-teller, as a matter of the law of rules, 
to prevail.  Except as against the defendant in a criminal case (where self-consciously 
political judgments take this authority away from the judge), the judge may rule that “as a 
matter of law” the narrative does not warrant success, ruling in effect, “if that is what you 
say occurred, you are not entitled to prevail.”  The background of the law of rules is one of 
the constraining agencies on trial narrative.  The law of rules remains the second of the 
strands in the advocate’s double helix. 
 
 The opening statements are not only stories.  They have a performative dimension: 
they are promises.  They are promises made to the human beings on the jury to produce 
evidence to support each of the more highly characterized and value-laden assertions 
made. This creates another of the most important defining tensions that occurs at trial. To 
invoke one of the rhetorical commonplaces frequently heard in closing argument, a trial 
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lawyer who fails to produce credible evidence to support the story he tells in opening 
statement has “broken his promise” and deliberately frustrated the jury in its sworn task.   
 
 Most of the trial is consumed with witness testimony.  Testimony comes to the jury 
through the direct examination of witnesses.  We have already seen the received view’s 
understanding of the highly artificial structure of direct examination, an understanding that 
has some force.  But those canons serve other functions at trial as well, normative and 
“factual.”  The life-world norms around which the narratives of opening statement are 
woven are inevitably over-generalized.  They are prejudgments (“prejudices”) about likely 
occurrences and their likely evaluations.  The obsessive perceptual detail of direct 
examination serves not only to provide reliable bases for factual inference, but also serves 
to refine the norms for common-sense judgment.  They force the jury to determine the 
reach of those norms in ways that “pre-existent” common sense never has.  For example, in 
ways that outrun doctrinal elaboration, the trial of a contract case may force the jury to 
decide whether the norms surrounding promise-keeping really extend to the detailed 
factual pattern that emerges at trial.  Opening statements have presented to the jury 
“diplomatic” accounts by trial diplomats which attempt to account for, to be fair to, all of 
the norms what inhabit the life-world and the law of rules.  Witnesses, even well-prepared 
witnesses are, mercifully, unlikely to be so diplomatic and the personal accounts that they 
give relatively indifferent to the more coherent accounts given in opening statements.  (By 
the end of trial, both lawyers will understand that any opening statement is likely to have 
been at least a bit too coherent for the “booming, buzzing confusion” that William James 
found in the world.)  The trial thus serves as a critique of common sense morality.  
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 But the Spartan narratives of direct examination have, in contrast to opening 
statements, more epistemological significances as well.  This is because of the structure of 
common sense inference.  Recall that every bit of evidence offered will be linked to a 
material fact by an empirical generalization that forms part of our web of belief.  For 
example, in evaluating a romantically disappointed defendant’s motive to engage in a 
violent act against his former lover, the jury may begin with a common sense 
generalization such as, “Generally and for the most part, rejected lovers experience 
powerful negative emotions toward the person who rejected them.”  The defense will 
counter with a qualifying generalization, such as “….but not where the person rejected has 
another romantic interest who is requiting his love…”  You can see that this process of 
qualification that tests the extension of every common sense generalization in the web of 
belief could go on almost to infinity: 
The jury will necessarily ask implicitly, “How universal is the 
commonsense generalization that links the circumstantial evidence to the 
episode in the bare narrative for which it is offered as proof?” Since the 
structure of the commonsense generalizations that provide those links is 
always, “Generally and for the most part…” the next question is always 
“Are all the particular additional facts in this case (F2…..Fn) such as to 
make the generalization more or less powerful than it would be, all other 
things being equal?”  But the existence of these latter facts (F2…..Fn) and 
their proper characterizations will themselves be in dispute just as is F1. 
And the strength of the commonsense generalizations that link those facts to 
what the proponent seeks to show is also caught in another web of mutually 
determining probabilities. (Burns 1999: 190, edited) 
 
This account tends to suggest a “coherence” theory of the kind of truth that is available at 
trial.  (However, although it is a pudding, to borrow from Henry James description of the 
novel, it is a lumpy pudding: some of the bits of evidence may resist recharacterization in 
one of the two theories offered and so support the alternative.)  The extent to which trial 
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narratives can reveal the “truth of what is,” in Gadamer’s words, the meaning of what 
occurred, depends on the ability of hermeneutical modes of thought to converge on 
something that may fairly be called a “practical truth.” (Burns 1999: 233-35)  The quoted 
paragraph speaks of a “bare narrative,” an account in the language of perception of “what 
happened.”  That kind of narrative, is, as we have seen, only one kind of narrative at play 
in the trial and answers only one kind of question: “What would you have seen had you 
been there?”  But there are other forms of narrative and they seek to answer other 
questions: How shall we best characterize those events? How shall we interpret their 
meaning? How shall we evaluate the actions underlying them? (How shall we allocate 
Aristotle’s “praise and blame?”) What will judging this action this way or that say about 
our moral identity, who we are?  (Taylor 1990: 3-53) Which legal category best comprises 
these actions and events (to give the received view its due)?  And then there are more 
specifically political questions: “What does deciding this case one way or another say 
about our political identity and what kind of a political society ought we to be?”   In ways I 
cannot describe here, the narratives of the trial can address each of these questions.  In any 
given trial, one or other may be the most important question, though it is up to the jury to 
make this determination of relative importance which literally decides the case. 
 
 There are also deconstructive devices at play in the trial.  Cross-examination serves 
to deconstruct or disrupt the meaningful narrative of direct examination. Cross may 
construct a competing narrative to the one the witness has told, may reveal facts omitted 
from an artful direct examination that are broadly “incoherent” with the meaning the direct 
examiner sought to convey (that change its meaning or challenge its plausibility).  Cross 
 12 
may manifest aspects of the witness’s character important to the underlying events on trial, 
and which, in many different ways, undermining the credibility of the witness herself.  
Finally, closing argument contains any number of rhetorical devices, on the one hand to 
support the original interpretation of the events embedded in the opening statement and, on 
the other, to argue that the evidence presented simply cannot be assimilated to the 
opposing theory (the pudding is too lumpy for that proposed interpretation).  All of this 
serves, in a well-tried case, to converge on a truth beyond story-telling.  Just as art can 
achieve a truth beyond the ineffable.  
 
 These narrative engagements occur under circumstances so obvious that their 
significance is easy to miss.  (“What is closest to us is hardest to see….”) The semiotic of 
the trial elevates the importance of the concrete and specific aspects of the case and 
discourages easy generalizations; it allows the witnesses only the representational function 
of language (usually no performatives such as promising or urging); the lawyers are given 
license to be astoundingly intrusive so long as topics are relevant; it progressives through 
time (something intrinsic to drama)  so that for a moment, every piece of evidence may be 
the privileged lens through which to see all the rest of the evidence; the trial is temporally 
compressed (in sharp contrast with many European proceedings) so as to emphasize 
interpretive unities of theory and theme;  it consists of a rhythm between continuous 
speech and interruption with conflicting perspectives; as American judges do not comment 
substantively on the case and never tell an “official” story, it presents a true polyphony of 
perspectives which is not resolved save by the verdict itself.  
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The Trial as Drama 
 This process of narrative construction and deconstruction occurs in a medium that 
can only be called dramatic.  It is an oral medium where real persons speak sometimes to 
the jury and sometimes to each other.  Thomas Green, in his magisterial account of the 
history of the English jury trial, Verdict According to Conscience, argued that the face-to-
face nature of the trial has always served to remind the participants that the proceeding was 
somehow about justice.  Because the trial is a performance, the jury may judge in a direct, 
“prepredicative” way, whether a particular story or a particular argument “rings true.”  The 
jury may dwell in the confrontations that occur between judge and lawyer, lawyer and 
lawyer, lawyer and witness.  Listening involves a “turning to the Other.  An epistemology 
of listening compels us toward dialogue rather than detachment.”  (O’Fallon & Ryan 1990: 
896-97)  In listening “[i]n a certain sense we have to become the other person; or rather, 
we let him become part of us for a brief second.  We suspend our own identities, after 
which we come back to ourselves and accept or reject what he has said” (Hibbitts 1994: 
344).  But the listening at trial occurs from a rather formal special distance, dramatizing 
both requirements for the doing of justice, “sympathy and detachment.”  (Beiner 1984: 
102)  Drama qualifies the hegemony of generalities, giving “a more urgent reality to the 
particular acts that establish distance between a given case and general rule or that expose 
a given case to competing rules…” (Ball  1981: 61)  As Bentley said about the theater, “the 
little ritual of performance, given just a modicum of competence, can lend to the events 
represented another dimension, a more urgent reality.” (Bentley 1997: 207)  
Dramatizations serve to “extricate the their subject matter from that which is considered to 
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be inessential to it and simultaneously reveal that which is most significant,”  which 
Gadamer calls “the truth of what is.” (Warnke 1987: 58).  In short: 
The dramatic form of the trial deepens the general tension between 
involvement and distance distinctive to the trial as oral communication… It 
allows for some sympathetic identification by those aspects of common 
sense invoked in different ways by each lawyer, while distancing the 
audience from each vision, in order to allow some limited transcendence of 
commonsense judgment. (Burns 1999: 138, notes omitted). 
 
 There is much more that could be said, but I will stop.  The American trial is one of 
the great achievements of our public culture.  By dramatizing some of the most demanding 
conflicts which constitute our common lives, it allows us to do what we American 
(post)moderns need to do, “less to create constantly new forms of life than to creatively 
renew actual forms by taking advantage of their internal multiplicity and tensions with one 
another.” (Kolb 1986: 259) 
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